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Abstract 
Numerous commentators have noted the tendency of retail petroleum prices to cycle.  This paper 
undertakes a formal analysis of petroleum price cycles, using spectral analysis to uncover which cycles are 
most important, and regression analysis to ascertain what drives that importance. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores a phenomenon which has been widely observed in the past by both policymakers 
(ACCC, 2007, WASCPPP, 2000) and academic researchers (Wang, 2006, 2007b); the prices of retail 
petroleum in Perth tend to cycle.  The paper extends extant analysis in two important ways.  Firstly, it 
formally studies the price cycles using spectral analysis.  Secondly, it endeavours to uncover some of what 
the ACCC (2007) calls the enigmatic nature of price cycles, by regressing the importance of certain key 
cycles against a range of explanatory factors. 
 
Section Two of this paper provides a brief overview of the Perth retail petroleum market.  Section Three 
summarises the technique of spectral analysis and the results of the spectral analysis of Perth’s retail 
petroleum outlets’ prices.  Section Four introduces the econometric model which seeks to explain certain 
key elements of the petroleum price cycle and presents the results of this analysis.  Section Five concludes. 
THE PERTH RETAIL PETROLEUM MARKET 
Perth, the capital city of Western Australia, is served by roughly 350 petrol stations.  It is located thousands 
of kilometres from any city of comparable size, and a hundred from the nearest major town.  Its retail 
petroleum market is thus isolated from any other.  BP, Caltex-Ampol, Mobil and Shell, the four “majors” 
(vertically integrated firms with upstream refining operations) operational in Australia, also operate in 
Perth, with Caltex-Ampol having the largest market share and BP the only refining operations.  As is 
common elsewhere in Australia, and indeed globally, the majors own and operate only a small number of 
outlets directly, utilising either franchising arrangements or independent stores which carry the major’s 
brand under a licensing arrangement for the remainder.  The former often receive price-support during the 
low points of the price cycle, whilst the latter do not.  This obviously influences their competitiveness.   
 
A number of independent brands also serve the city; Gull, Peak, Liberty and Wesco.  Of these Gull has 
both the largest presence and the only import terminal.  During the study period, there is also one joint 
venture between a supermarket and a major; that between Woolworths and Caltex-Ampol.  Each of the 
majors has a wholesaling terminal (BP has two), as does Gull.  However, their location is not an important 
factor in retail competition, as Comonar & Riddle (2003) suggests they are in California, because almost all 
of them are located in the same place. 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Perth retail petroleum market is the prices of petrol stations; they 
cycle, as shown in Figure One.1
 
 
                                                 



























































































Figure 1: An Example of Perth’s Price Cycles – Shell 
 
During the period of study, the cycle lasts roughly a week, increasing over the first day or two, and then 
decreasing slowly through the remainder of the week.  This pattern is known as an Edgeworth Cycle 
(Maskin & Tirole, 1988).  Both academic (Wang, 2006, 2007a, 2007b) and government (ACCC, 2007) 
authors have noted such cycles before, and the ACCC study shows they are not restricted to Perth.  Indeed, 
they are not a uniquely Australian phenomenon; Noel (2007a, 2007b) and Eckert & West (2003) study 
them in a Canadian context, and Allvine & Peterson (1974) and Castanias & Johnson (1993) note their 
presence in some US markets.  They are not, however, ubiquitous; they are much rarer in Australia’s 
regional centres than in its capital cities.  Noel (2007) notes that some Canadian cities have cycling retail 
petroleum prices and some do not.  The variation induced by cycling prices causes community concern, and 
calls for political action; WASCPPP (2000) provides a rather heated example of both. 
 
Like all retail petroleum markets in Australia, Perth has been subject to substantial regulation, beyond the 
environmental, health and safety and planning controls which one might expect as standard practice.  
During the study period, the most pervasive Federal Government controls were the Sites Act, and the 
Franchisees’ Act. Each of these Acts had its origin in the 1976 Royal Commission on the Marketing and 
Pricing of Petroleum Products, and each was passed in 1980.  The former is designed to limit the number of 
outlets each of the majors can own and restricted the majors to a total of five percent of each market, 
roughly half their share prior to the passage of the Act.  Originally the Royal Commission recommended 
complete divorcement, but the majors argued successfully that they needed some retail presence for 
training and market research purposes.  From 1984, the proportion of the five percent which each major 
could own was based on its market share over the previous three years.  The latter is designed to protect the 
interest of retail petroleum outlet franchisees, and places a number of restrictions on the terms and 
conditions of franchise contracts written between each major and its franchisees.  Both the Sites Act and the 
Franchisees Act were repealed in 2007 and replaced with an industry code, the OilCode. 
 
The Perth market is also subject to the State Fuelwatch scheme.  Under the aegis of the Petroleum Pricing 
Regulations 2000, retail petroleum outlets are required to report their proposed prices for the next day’s 
trading to a government regulator (Fuelwatch) before 2pm.  The prices change at 6am the next day, and the 
retailer is not permitted to change them again for 24 hours.  The lowest prices are publicised in television 
and print media, and on the Fuelwatch website (www.fuelwatch.com.au/ ).  Recently, following a report by 
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the ACCC (2007), the Federal Government has advocated the adoption of a nation-wide Fuelwatch scheme, 
but at the time of writing, this has yet to come to pass.   
The Study Period 
Fuelwatch has generated a census of price data from its inception in 2001 as it legally requires all retailers 
of all types of fuel (unleaded petrol, premium unleaded petrol, diesel and liquefied petroleum gas) to report 
their prices everyday.2  However, this study concerns itself with only a portion of this data; from January 
1st 2003 to March 14th 2004, only unleaded fuel and only roughly two-thirds of the sites which retail fuel in 
Perth.  The start date is chosen because, prior to this date, terminal gate prices are not available and hence 
gross margins (retail prices minus the TGP) cannot be calculated.  The end date is chosen because, on the 
following day, Coles and Shell operationalised their joint venture, turning 40 Shell Select and Shell outlets 
into Coles Express outlets.  This greatly increased the number of supermarket-affiliated outlets which 
operate “shopper-docket” schemes; spending a certain amount in the supermarket in question allows one a 
discount of a few cents per litre (see ACCC, 2004, for a detailed account).  This may have changed 
consumer and supplier behaviour.  To avoid these effects influencing model results, the study period 
focussed on the period prior to the advent of Coles Express.  Unleaded fuel was the main focus of the study 
because diesel and LPG are subject to different market pressures due to their use by the transport and taxi 
industries (respectively), and premium unleaded fuel is excluded because it is a much smaller niche market. 
 
During the study period, roughly 350 outlets operated within the Perth metropolitan area; 357 at the outset, 
and 341 by the end.  Perth is a relatively low-density city, and is ringed by smaller urban centres on its 
fringes.  Retail petroleum outlets in these smaller centres form small local groupings, but are sufficiently 
distant from any other outlet within the Metropolitan area that it seems unlikely that they are being 
influenced by price movements within it.  For this reason, 76 outlets on the fringes of the city have been 
excluded from the study.  Of the remainder, not all were open for the entire period; 28 closed and 18 
opened between January 2003 and march 2004.  These 46 sites have incomplete datasets.  Most new sites 
which opened (in fact, all but four of the 18) were not green-field sites, but new owners (usually 
independents) opening on an existing site (usually sold by a major).  Typically, there were many months 
between one site closing and its replacement opening.  A small number of Caltex-Woolworths outlets, 
operating from shopping centre car-parks, were not open on Sundays when the shopping centre was closed 
and hence also had missing data.  These stations with missing data were excluded from the sample.3  
Finally, 21 outlets had fewer than ten price increases of more than five percent in a single day; the indicator 
used for the upward phase of a price cycle.  By contrast, most outlets had roughly 50 such events.  The 21 
outlets were thus excluded from the sample.  For most, either fuel sales were a secondary part of their 
business,4 or they were relatively small, independently owned businesses, distant from competition and 
serving only a local niche market.  We are thus left with 209 outlets which form the basis of this analysis.  
Figure Two shows the proportion of different brands in the market. 
                                                 
2 The author acknowledges the kind assistance of the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection in providing the data used 
in this study. 
3 The result is that Caltex-Woolworths outlets are under-represented in the sample; 20 were open for part of the period, 11 were open 
for the whole period, but only four are in the sample.  Results in the econometric analysis should be interpreted with this in mind. 
4 Legally, all retailers of petrol, diesel or LPG must provide data, and this includes a number of mechanic shops, a marina, a taxi firm 






















Figure 2: Retail Petroleum Outlets by Brand 
 
Caltex-Ampol has the largest share, followed by BP and Shell.  Mobil, despite being a major, only has a 
relatively small presence in Perth, only half that of the largest of the independent chain, Gull.  Whilst there 
are many stores which are independently-owned, only two of these carry no branding.  Branding is not the 
same as ownership; a retail petroleum outlet carrying a particular brand might be owned by the brand 
owner, a franchisee or an independent operator who has merely paid a licensing fee for the use of the brand.  
It is therefore also important to examine ownership.  Figure Three provides results for the whole market, 









































Figure 4: Ownership Patterns Amongst Major-Branded Outlets 
 
Not all of those carrying the brand of a larger independent chain (Gull, Peak or Wesco) in Figure Two are 
labelled “larger independent” in Figure Three.  Some Peak and Gull outlets are not owned by Gull or Peak, 
but are independently-owned, and just carry their respective brands.  The independent chains are thus 
engaging in the same kind of risk management that the majors use for their own branded independents. 
 
In Figures Three and Four, the “company controlled” designation refers to outlets owned and operated by 
the independent chains, and, where branded with a major’s brand, to both outlets owned by the majors 
themselves, and outlets owned by multi-site franchisees.  This is an artefact of the Fuelwatch reporting 
system.  BP and Shell operate multi-site franchises.  Thus, there are no BP or Shell outlets listed as “price 
supported”, even though some of the franchisees may have been.  By contrast, Caltex-Ampol has only 
single-site franchises, all of which are price supported.  To understand how many outlets in listed as 
company controlled are owned by BP and Shell, it is necessary to turn to data from the Federal Department 
of Resources, Industry and Tourism, which administered the Sites Act whilst it was in operation.  These 
data are presented in Figure Five. 
 
Unfortunately, the Department of Resources Industry and Tourism data do not indicate which outlets were 
owned by the majors.  Thus, whilst we know that roughly five of the 50 BP sites in WA and eight of the 58 
Shell sites listed as company controlled were actually owned by BP and Shell (respectively), we do not 








































BP Total BP Owned BP Country Shell Total
Shell Owned Shell Country   
Figure 5: BP and Shell Outlets – Owned and Franchised 
 
One final aspect worth exploring is the prevalence of convenience stores.  Each of the majors has one 
convenience store brand, and Caltex has two.  These are: Shell Select, BP Connect, Caltex Starshop, Caltex 
Starmart and Mobil Quix.  Whilst Mobil, Shell and BP own all of their convenience stores, Caltex 
convenience stores are as likely to be operated by franchisees as they are to be operated by Caltex itself.  
Convenience stores are important because most of the profit comes from the sale of non-fuel items such as 
hot snacks, drinks, newspapers and cigarettes; fuel is a loss-leader.  Figure Six provides an overview of the 









BP Caltex Mobil Shell
Convenience Store Other  
Figure 6: Convenience Stores and Other Outlets Operated by the Majors 
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SPECTRAL ANALYSIS 
Spectral analysis involves examining the relevant data in the frequency domain rather than in the time 
domain.  If a certain lag is important in a model constructed in the time domain, then the cycle with period 
equal too that lag will have high power in the frequency domain analysis.  It is thus not a case of which 
method is “right”, but rather of which more clearly highlights underlying patterns in a dataset. 
 
Spectral analysis is widely used in the physical sciences, but less so in economics.  However, it has found 
application in areas where variables cycle such as business cycle analysis (Jagric, 2002, Englund, Persson 
& Svenson, 1992, Baxter, 1991 and Diebold & Ruderbusch, 1990), commodity cycles (Rausser & Cargill, 
1975, Weiss, 1975 and Slade, 1982) and housing cycles (Clembout & Nefti, 1981, Wilson & Okunev, 
1998).  It has also proven particularly useful in examining relationships between variables that cycle (Grace 
& Hotchkiss, 1995, Pakko, 1994, Orlov, 2006 and Rua & Nunes, 2005).  Finally, it has found important 
application in financial time series analysis (Brooks & Hinich, 2006, Kim & In, 2003), although it is being 
replaced by wavelet analysis in this regard, as it is better able to handle transient shocks. 
 
There are a number of reasons why spectral analysis might not be widespread in economics.  Firstly, 
economic time series are often non-stationary.  Of those that are stationary, many follow processes with 
simple lag structures, and indeed it is possible to speak of a “typical spectral shape” for many economic 
variables (Granger, 1966, Levy & Dezbakhsh, 2003).  There may be few advantages in examining such 
variables in the frequency domain.  Also, spectral analysis does not lend itself easily to prediction, often a 
major focus for economic analysis of time series.  Here, however, I have a stationary time series (see 
below) with a complex lag structure, for which I am seeking explanation, rather than prediction.  Thus, the 
use of spectral analysis seems appropriate. 
 
It is not the intention to provide here a detailed exposition of spectral analysis; Granger & Hatanaka (1964), 
Hamilton (1994) and Chatfield (2006) provide three detailed treatments.  Rather, I provide a brief overview 
of the procedures followed here.    Spectral analysis is intimately linked with the autocovariance function 
and reveals a great deal about variance.  In fact, it allows one to decompose variance into components of 
different frequency, and see how much smoother the series would be without each one. 
 
The explanatory power each cycle has over variance can be shown via the periodogram, which contains all 
of the information in the autocovariannce function (all of the lags).  However, periodograms are rarely used 
because, whilst they are unbiased, they are inconsistent; longer lags in the autocovariance function are 
based on very little information.  Thus kernel estimators are used to derive a spectrogram, which is 
consistent, but which contains some bias (see Granger & Hatanaka, 1964).  Many kernel estimators are 
possible (see Chatfield, 2006), but here I use the Tukey-Hanning estimator, which assigns a decreasing 
weight to each cycle, up to a certain period, and a zero weight to all those with longer periods.  The three 
steps followed are as follows: 
• First, the autocovariance function is specified, out to a certain lag length (or down to a certain 
































where n is the total sample size (441 here), and k=0,1,2,…M represents the lags of the variable in 
question, x.  










































Whilst the angular frequency is mathematically easiest to use, it is difficult to interpret. Thus, for all the 
spectrograms presented in this paper, the horizontal axis shows the frequency band in terms of its period 
(2m/j) rather than its angular frequency (πj/m).  The derivation of the spectrogram as outlined above is 
relatively simple, but three issues are important to consider; the number of observations, the size of the 
truncation point M and the frequency of observations. 
 
The number of observations will obviously influence the length of cycle which can be captured.  Granger & 
Hatanaka (1964) suggest that five or six repetitions of a cycle are required before there is sufficient 
information to capture the cycle’s characteristics.  The very lowest frequency band captures not only the 
lowest frequencies which the data can reveal, but also all of the variation for which cycles are too long to 
be captured by the data.  It can thus often be very large, particularly in economic data, where longer cycles 
are common.  Petrol price cycles are roughly one week long.  With 441 daily observations, there should be 
sufficient information to capture this cycle effectively. 
 
The choice of the truncation point M influences the width of the frequency bands for which power is 
estimated.  The wider are the bands, or the more smoothing is applied to the periodogram to derive the 
spectrogram, the greater is the likelihood that important information will remain buried.  A larger M results 
in narrower bands, but also replicates the problems of consistency which plague the periodogram.  
Unfortunately, there is no clear, objective standard to judge which level of M is correct.  However, 
Chatfield (2006) suggests the use of, M=2√N is common in the literature.  With 441 observations, this 
gives M=42.  I examined different values of M for a small number of retail petroleum outlets and found no 
more cycles when a higher value of M was used, and lesser clarity in distinguishing between cycles of 
around a week in length when a smaller M was used.  For this reason, M=42 is used in the analysis below. 
 
In most cases, the frequency of observation is important for spectral analysis, due to the problem of 
aliasing.  If the variable of interest changes with greater frequency than the frequency of observation, then 
it is not clear whether the power one observes at a particular frequency is really due to cycles of that 
frequency, or to some linear combination of frequencies with shorter period than the gap between 
observations.  Here, however, this is less of an issue; the highest frequency captured is two days and by 
law, petrol stations can change their prices only once per day.  Since one needs more than one change in a 
variable for a cycle to occur, there is no chance of aliasing.  This will obviously not be the case in 
jurisdictions where intra-day variation in prices is possible. 
Spectra of Perth’s Retail Petroleum Outlets 
This section presents the results of the spectral analysis for each of the 209 stations in the sample, for 441 
days from January 1st 2003 to March 14th 2004.  As noted previously, the spectral representation theorem 
applies only to covariance-stationary data.  Thus, the first step of the spectral analysis is a test of the 
stationarity of the retail petroleum price data.5  I tested this using a Philips-Peron unit root test (which has 
higher power in samples characterised by serial correlation or heteroscedasticity) on the price series for 
each station in the sample.  Unit root tests have relatively low power.  To increase the robustness of results, 
therefore, I undertook two unit root tests; one on the data ordered from t0 to t441, and one on the data 
ordered from t441 to t0.  The results of this analysis are shown in Figure Seven, which summarises those 
from tests undertaken on data ordered t0 to t441.  The results of the reverse-order tests are very similar.  The 
solid lines in Figure Seven represent critical values, and the diamonds (each set matching the colour of one 
line) show the test scores for each outlet in each of the six different specifications of the test which 
SHAZAM (2004) reports.   
 
                                                 
5 I have not tested retail petroleum margins, also used in this paper.  However, if prices are stationary, it seems unlikely that margins 





























Figure 7: Unit Root Test Results 
 
Aside from one outlet (circled in red) for which the null hypothesis was rejected in some versions of the 
test, all outlets rejected the null in all formulations of the test and in both orderings of the data.  It thus 
seems unlikely that the data are non-stationary, and therefore reasonable to use spectral analysis. 
 
Spectra for price levels and gross margins were estimated for all 209 stations.  The results are shown in 
Figures Eight and Nine.  In each, the red lines indicate Caltex or Ampol-branded stations, green indicates 
BP, orange indicates Shell, light blue indicates Mobil, and dark blue indicates all of the non-major branded 































































































































The first and most obvious aspect of Figures Eight and Nine is the dual peak; whilst most of the Caltex-
Ampol stations have peaks at seven days, BP and Shell stations show peaks at seven and ten days.  
Moreover, it is not the case that some of the BP or Shell outlets follow cycles of seven days and some 
follow cycles of ten.  In fact, most BP and Shell outlets exhibit both seven and ten day cycles.  In terms of 
strategy, they appear to randomise between the two cycle lengths. 
 
The dual peak should not be surprising.  Indeed, it is more intuitively logical than a single peak.  If a retail 
petroleum outlet only followed one seven day cycle, this would become immediately obvious to all of its 
rivals, and indeed if a set of retail petroleum outlets all strictly followed seven day cycles, then they would 
very quickly be able to co-ordinate around this strategic equilibrium.  Such co-ordination is, however, sub-
optimal; if firms can co-ordinate, they should do so around the peak of each cycle, where profits are higher.  
Since cycles represent a failure of co-ordination, then they should logically not be so consistent that they 
can be easily guessed each time the outlets interact. 
 
Two other sets of peaks exist.  The first of these is in the lowest frequency band.  It is much more 
pronounced in the prices spectrogram than in it is for margins.  This suggests evidence of underlying long 
cycles in petroleum demand, which may be related to seasonal demand differences or a rising crude oil 
price.  The low frequency peak in the margins spectrogram is much smaller than it is for prices, which is 
not surprising, as margins are less closely related to crude oil and wholesale price levels. 
 
Peaks also occur at 21, 14 and 3.5 days.  These are the harmonics of the seven-day price cycle.  Since few 
cycles are perfectly sinusoidal, harmonics such as this are common in spectral analysis.  All that they 
indicate is that the seven-day cycle is both important and not perfectly sinusoidal; they are not important 
cycles in their own right. 
Importance of Seven and Ten Day Cycles  
Figures Eight and Nine indicate that cycles of seven and roughly ten days are important.  Moreover, they 
are not demonstrably tied to upstream factors such as changes in wholesale prices This raises two important 
questions: 
• How important are these cycles? 
• What drives them? 
 
The first of these questions is addressed below, whilst the latter is addressed in the modelling in the 
following section. 
 
The area under the spectrogram over a band of frequencies indicates the contribution of those frequencies 
to overall variance.  Thus, the area under the seven and ten day cycles in each spectrogram will indicate the 
importance of these cycles.  Put differently, it will indicate how much smoother price cycles would be 
likely to be without these two cycles. 
 
Since 42 is not divisible by 10, I combine the two bands either side of this frequency, that centred around 
9.33 and that centred around 10.55 days.  Each has roughly equal power.  Since these two cycles are 
combined, using the seven day cycle alone would give results that understate that cycle’s importance 
relative to the nine and ten day cycle.  Thus, I use two approaches.  The first makes use of the concept of 
spectral leakage (see Granger & Hatanaka, 1964, pp132-4); some of the power of a particular bandwidth is 
due to its neighbours, as no spectral window is perfect at its edges, and is the sum of seven and 7.64 day 
cycles.  The second makes use of harmonics, and is the sum of  21, 14, seven and 3.5 day cycle powers.  In 
each case, the share of the seven-day cycle in the total is between a half and two thirds for most outlets.  
Figure Ten shows four histograms highlighting the distribution of cycle power.  The seven day cycles refer 


















































































































































































Figure 10: Power of Seven and Ten Day Cycles 
 
On average, the seven day cycle contributes roughly ten percent of the variation in prices and 18-19 percent 
of the variation in margins.  The figures for the nine and ten day cycle are roughly three-quarters of these 
figures, for both price levels and margins.  This is useful for policymakers, for it indicates that removing 
these two cycles would reduce variability by only roughly a third and, as the econometric analysis below 
suggests, may increase prices at the same time. 
 
Given an understanding of the contribution these cycles make to overall price variability, it remains to 
examine what drives this contribution.  This is the task of the next section. 
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MODEL OF CYCLE DRIVERS 
In order to explore what drives the seven and ten day cycles, I regress the power of each frequency for each 
outlet against a range of explanatory variables in a cross-sectional regression consisting of all retail outlets 
in the sample.  Table One explains each of the variables, grouped into three categories. 
 
Table One: Regression Model Explanatory Variables 
Station Characteristics 
Variable Type Variable Name(s) Variable Description 
Brand AM, BP, CAL, CW, 
GL, IND, LIB, 
MOB, PK, SH, WC 
10 dummy variables, one for each brand; Ampol, BP, Caltex. 
Caltex-Woolworths, Gull, independent, Liberty. Mobil, Peak, 
Shell and Wesco) 
Location NM, SM, EM 3 dummy variables, denoting North of the Swan River, South of 
the Swan River and on the Eastern fringe of the city 
Type BI, CC, DC, I, LI, 
PS, SUP 
7 dummy variables indicating whether a station is a (major) 
branded independent, company controlled, distributor controlled, 
independent, a larger independent (Gull or Peak), price supported 
or a joint venture with a supermarket (just Woolworths). 
Service CS, FS, NS 3 dummy variables indicating the availability of conditional 
service, full service or no mechanical servicing. 
Convenience 
Store 
BPC, CSM, CSS, 
MQ, SS 
5 dummy variables indicating whether the outlet has one of the 
majors’ convenience stores; BP Connect, Caltex Starmart, Caltex 
Starshop, Mobil Quix or Shell Select. 
Main Road MRD Dummy variable indicating whether an outlet is on a main road or 
a side street. 
Number of 
Competitors 
COMP Number of competitors located within 5km of an outlet, with the 
distance measured along the shortest road route. 
Distance to 
Competitor 
DISTC Distance to the nearest competitor via the shortest road route 
from each outlet. 
Price Characteristics 
Variable Name Variable Description 
PID Number of days when prices increase. 
PRD Number of days when prices decrease 
AVMIN Average gross margin at minimum retail price 
MAXMIN Average difference between the maximum and minimum of a price cycle 
APRU Average  daily price reduction during the declining phase of the price cycle 
Demand Characteristics 
Variable Name Variable Description 
MFY Median family Income 
AHHS Average Household size 
NA Number aboriginal residents in the area 
NP Total number of persons in the area 
NOS Number born overseas in the area 
NDC Number of families with dependent children in the area 
NSM Number of families headed by a single mother in the area 
NF Total number of families in the area 
NV Average number vehicles per household 
DD Dwelling density (houses per square km) 
NRD Number of rented dwellings in the area 
NSHCD Number of state housing dwellings in the area 
ND Total number of dwellings in the area 
ED Number of inhabitants with post-school qualification 
EMP Number of inhabitants employed 
PUBT Number of inhabitants using public transport to travel to work 
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The data in the price characteristics group were simply drawn from the set of prices for each retail outlet.  
The data for station characteristics were mostly drawn from the Fuelwatch dataset from which the price 
data were drawn.  The data for the number of nearby competitors and the distance to the nearest competitor 
was not drawn from the Fuelwatch dataset, but was calculated by hand for each station using an electronic 
version of the Perth street directory which contained simple distance-measuring software.  Distances are 
not Euclidean, but are rather “as the car drives”; the shortest distance alonge the road network between 
each station.  The five kilometre cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary, but it has some basis in the literature, 
which suggests retail petroleum stations influence each other’s behaviour over roughly this distance (see 
Hastings, 2004, USSPSICGA, 2002 or FTC, 2001).   
 
Demand-side data were drawn from the 2006 Australian Census Community Profiles (ABS, 2006).  The 
choice of demand characteristics was drawn from the literature on demand elasticity for retail petroleum 
(see, for example, Nicol, 2003, Epsey, 1996, Kayser, 2000, Ridler & Greening, 1999 or Archibald & 
Gilligan, 1980).  Community profile data at the post-code level were matched with the post-code of each 
retail petroleum outlet.  Australia undertakes a census once every five years, and the 2006 census data were 
used over the 2001 data because the former were slightly easier to extract from the ABS website.  There 
may be some bias in this approach, if the values of demand-side variables have changed in a relative sense 
between suburbs since 2003.  However, any bias which results is likely to be smaller than that which results 
by assuming demand is associated with geographically localised areas, particularly for outlets which are 
located on major roads, and attract passing traffic from other areas.6
Model Results 
Tables Two and Three below present the results of econometric modelling undertaken using the data 
summarised above in Table One.  The models were estimated using standard ordinary least squares 
procedures, but with White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator to account for potential 
heteroscedasticity amongst the retail petroleum outlets.7  As shown in Table One above, there are six 
families of dummy variables from which to choose, and four of them (Brand, Location, Type and Service) 
fully specify the data.  Thus, one of these dummies must be dropped, or else the model will suffer from the 
dummy variable trap, and OLS estimation will no longer be possible due to perfect multi-collinearity.  Due 
to the large number of dummies, the constant term was also dropped from the regression. 
 
The approach followed was to try and obtain final models which were as close to each other as was 
practicable, in terms of the variables which are included.  Also, as a general rule, I excluded dummies 
where the number of ones in the dummy vector was relatively high.  This was a rather ad-hoc procedure 
which was designed to avoid the dummy variable trap.  This was a concern because, with four such 
families of dummies, if the dummy removed in one family had only one or two ones in it, then it was much 
more likely that the remaining dummies across the four families, could be combined to form an orthogonal 
basis to the regression space.  The likelihood was increased if two such ‘rare-dummies’ were removed. 
 
Partly for ‘rare-dummy’ reasons, the dummy variable for “independents” within the “type” family above 
was always removed, in conjunction with other type dummy.  Models which retained the independent 
dummy in this family but removed another all performed poorly.  Also, since there is only one joint venture 
between a supermarket chain and a major (the Caltex-Woolworths joint venture), the brand dummy CW is 
identical to the type dummy “SUP”.  Thus, CW was removed from the analysis.  Changing the location 
dummy or the service dummy made no difference to results.  Since it did not matter which of these was 
removed, each model is presented with SM and CS removed.  Changing the brand dummy which was 
removed and the type dummy which was removed did influence results.  This is because branding and type 
are fairly closely tied together (see Figures Three and Four and associated discussion).  I thus experimented 
with different removal combinations until obtaining the most robust results. 
                                                 
6 This assumption was necessary, given the lack of any other information on where an individual retail petroleum outlet’s customers 
come from.  Commuter traffic is an important source of out-of-area demand in many cities (See, for example, Marvel, 1976).  In Perth, 
this is likely to be less important, given that the CBD is the dominant work location, and travel into the CBD is largely along 
freeways, which contain no retail petroleum outlets.  Some bias, however, remains. 
7 The LM test statistics from the Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroscedasticity ranged from 5.6 to 21.6.  The critical value is 3.84 (at the 
five percent level of significance) and hence all models exhibit heteroscedasticity.   
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In terms of demand and price characteristics, the discussion above suggests a number of variables which 
might be important, but many of those shown in Table One transpired not to be statistically significant.  
This lack of statistical significance was quite robust across model specifications.  To ascertain which of the 
price and demand-side variables might safely be removed, I first undertook an F-test for each of those 
which was not significant in the fully-specified model, to ascertain whether the explanatory power of a 
model which included these variables (individually) was greater than one which did not.  In no case did the 
F-test results suggest this was the case.  I then took out each of these non-significant variables in turn, and 
examined whether their removal altered the significance of any of the remaining price and demand 
variables.  Where a variable did nothing, it was discarded.  Where its removal did alter the significance of 
another demand or price variable (all of these made either PUBT or EMP significant, none had any other 
effect), I kept them in, and went through the same procedure again; with models that had eliminated all the 
variables which had no effect, I went through and removed each of the non-significant variables in turn, to 
ascertain whether such removal changed the significance of any other variable.  I also examined whether 
the removal of all non-significant variables except each one in turn changed the significance of any other 
demand or price variable.  The results of all of this testing were fairly consistent; the only variable which 
became statistically significant was PUBT, and when PUBT was the removed variable, EMP became 
statistically significant.  I therefore kept these two variables.  Thus, the models in Tables Two and Three, in 
terms of the price and demand variables (as specified in Table One above) contain all of those variables 
which were statistically significant in the original, unrestricted models, plus EMP and PUBT.  It is worth 
nothing that these changes in price and demand variables did not alter the significance of coefficients 
elsewhere in each model. 
 
One final point of note before the results are presented.  There were very few differences between the 
seven-day cycle results which were obtained by combining seven, and 7.64 day cycle frequencies, and 
those which were obtained using the harmonics of the seven-day cycle.  To save space, just the results of 
the former are presented below. 
 
Tables Two and Three present the results of the price level models and margins models respectively.  There 
are four models in each case; two for the seven-day cycle (one omitting BP and one Caltex) and two for the 
nine and ten-day cycles.  Since the data are not time series data, I do not test for serial correlation.  In each 
case, the R2 and adjusted R2 show that the models indicate good fit.  The model specification tests (the F-
tests) show the models are unlikely to be mis-specified, and the tests on the normality of the residuals show 





















Table Two: Price Levels Model Results 
  Price Levels, 7 Day Cycle Price Levels, 9&10 Day Cycle 











AM 0.1709 0.2953 1.6921 3.5730 0.5026 0.9776 -4.1991 -7.1640 
BP -1.7571 -3.1500     4.6832 10.2900     
CAL     1.3594 2.4790     -4.8958 -11.3600 
GL 0.1187 0.1330 1.8607 2.4020 3.9178 4.1660 -0.8522 -1.1060 
IND 0.0854 0.0843 1.8606 1.8650 1.5998 2.1770 -2.7890 -3.8860 
LIB -0.2346 -0.2349 1.4222 1.6720 4.4279 6.6810 -0.2418 -0.4449 
MOB -1.9754 -2.1320 -0.5093 -0.6651 2.2925 2.4700 -2.2304 -2.8710 
PK -0.2701 -0.2651 1.6972 1.9760 3.4638 3.5520 -1.5884 -2.0190 
SH 0.1604 0.2345 1.8245 3.7610 7.9181 13.4100 2.8689 6.8920 
WC 2.4746 2.0570 4.2705 3.7380 4.1394 3.8600 -0.7215 -0.8394 
EM 0.3079 0.9744 0.2542 0.7956 0.0775 0.2383 0.0696 0.2304 
NM -0.0870 -0.3861 -0.0773 -0.3331 0.2482 1.2270 0.2551 1.3460 
CC -0.2761 -0.6157     -0.1486 -0.4422     
LI -0.2104 -0.2331 -0.1805 -0.2191 -2.1272 -2.1260 -1.6929 -1.9510 
DC -1.3751 -1.3810 -1.3605 -1.5180 -0.3588 -0.6898 -0.2764 -0.6803 
BI -0.2115 -0.3088 -0.2073 -0.4066 -3.8675 -4.7150 -3.4522 -4.8700 
PS     0.2199 0.4859     0.0567 0.1761 
SUP -2.3360 -3.5820 -0.4956 -0.8295 3.0908 3.3080 -1.5245 -1.7810 
FS 0.0316 0.0696 0.0176 0.0384 -0.5888 -1.1750 -0.5037 -1.0500 
NS 0.0196 0.0823 -0.0361 -0.1490 -0.1324 -0.5830 -0.1002 -0.4844 
BPC -0.2312 -0.7592 -0.4351 -1.3970 -0.5441 -1.6040 -0.6410 -1.9970 
CSM 0.7170 1.5510 0.9194 1.9410 0.1235 0.3859 0.2439 0.8518 
CSS 0.4825 0.9262 0.6757 1.2780 0.1599 0.4222 0.3821 1.1330 
MQ 0.4970 0.6111 0.4948 0.6144 -0.4311 -0.4622 -0.4076 -0.4681 
SS 0.2923 0.4167 0.2573 0.3659 0.7653 0.8443 0.7804 0.9503 
MRD -0.0247 -0.0864 -0.0592 -0.2050 -0.1506 -0.6360 -0.0224 -0.1028 
COMP -0.0621 -2.1800 -0.0669 -2.2910 0.0213 0.7153 0.0349 1.2590 
DISTC -0.0095 -0.0693 -0.0218 -0.1564 0.0921 0.8232 0.0738 0.6996 
NMIN 0.1261 5.8610 0.1253 5.6640 0.0821 4.4220 0.0822 4.7800 
PID -0.0530 -2.6570 -0.0626 -3.1060 -0.0010 -0.0585 0.0149 0.8945 
AVMIN -0.8821 -4.6140 -0.9641 -4.7890 -0.3795 -1.9290 -0.2159 -1.1870 
MAXMIN 2.8601 15.7400 2.8284 15.0400 1.5585 8.5980 1.7017 10.1500 
NV -4.7414 -4.1150 -5.2474 -4.4420 -4.4141 -3.7970 -2.9334 -2.7270 
DD 0.0017 2.8890 0.0017 2.8940 -0.0008 -1.4140 -0.0009 -1.6700 
NSHCD -0.0018 -3.8620 -0.0019 -3.8430 -0.0013 -3.3560 -0.0009 -2.6860 
ED 0.0002 2.1060 0.0002 2.1310 0.0002 2.2500 0.0002 2.0110 
EMP 0.0002 2.1560 0.0002 2.2030 0.0000 -0.0728 0.0000 -0.6464 
PUBT -0.0028 -4.7760 -0.0030 -4.8470 -0.0009 -1.9300 -0.0005 -1.0410 
Model Robustness and Diagnostic Test Results 
 R2 0.9546  0.9527  0.9436  0.9510  
 Adjusted R2  0.9454 0.9432  0.9322  0.9411  
 Normality 
of Residuals  62.9414 (22 df)  66.4859 (22 df)  85.1756 (22 df) 66.7175 (22 df)  
 Model 







Table Three: Price Margins Models Results 
  Price Margins, 7 Day Cycle Price Margins,  9&10 Day Cycle 
  CAL, SM, PS & CS Out BP, SM, SUP & CS Out CAL, SM, PS & CS Out BP, SM, SUP & CS Out 
Variable Estimated t-Ratio Estimated t-Ratio Estimated t-Ratio Estimated t-Ratio 
AM 0.3307 0.6251 1.5861 3.6390 0.3842 0.7043 -4.4095 -7.3970 
BP -1.3305 -2.3790     4.8805 10.4400     
CAL     1.1144 2.0320     -4.9672 -11.0700 
GL 0.7674 0.8602 2.0906 2.7920 4.0694 4.5600 -0.8799 -1.2250 
IND 0.5479 0.5231 1.7110 1.3960 1.4782 2.0730 -2.4604 -2.1570 
LIB 0.4938 0.4853 1.7541 2.0280 4.7254 6.7740 -0.1344 -0.2275 
MOB -2.4407 -2.8480 -1.1224 -1.6630 3.4679 3.5800 -1.0786 -1.2870 
PK 0.4685 0.4580 2.0357 2.4180 3.6749 3.8930 -1.4561 -1.8970 
SH 0.7477 1.0930 2.0534 4.2030 8.0499 13.4000 2.9053 6.9680 
WC 3.2744 2.7070 4.7082 4.1950 4.5497 4.4470 -0.4161 -0.5083 
EM 0.3368 1.0560 0.3535 1.0950 0.0823 0.2509 0.1293 0.4285 
NM -0.1192 -0.5168 -0.1654 -0.7069 0.2853 1.4170 0.2427 1.2600 
CC -0.3374 -0.7663 -0.5444 -0.7439 -0.0977 -0.2807 0.5000 0.5603 
LI -0.3391 -0.3821 -0.4496 -0.4589 -2.6134 -2.7280 -1.5109 -1.2970 
DC -1.5559 -1.4390 -1.8408 -1.4880 -0.4701 -0.9223 0.1901 0.1990 
BI -0.3267 -0.4842 -0.5545 -0.6830 -4.1145 -4.9700 -3.1146 -2.8290 
PS     -0.2599 -0.3042     0.5132 0.5416 
SUP -2.2679 -3.5290     3.1862 3.4190     
FS 0.0513 0.1146 0.0257 0.0585 -0.5366 -1.1640 -0.4777 -1.0970 
NS -0.0188 -0.0780 -0.0873 -0.3615 -0.0885 -0.3885 -0.0826 -0.3965 
BPC -0.2125 -0.6840 -0.2240 -0.6997 -0.5482 -1.5900 -0.4934 -1.5200 
CSM 0.7446 1.5870 0.9294 1.9460 0.0627 0.1936 0.1842 0.6264 
CSS 0.4798 0.9052 0.6797 1.2810 0.1691 0.4496 0.3967 1.1660 
MQ 0.6006 0.8285 0.6344 0.8982 -0.3377 -0.3463 -0.2861 -0.3071 
SS 0.1831 0.2564 0.1721 0.2392 0.7075 0.7938 0.7356 0.8935 
MRD -0.0856 -0.3061 -0.1294 -0.4572 -0.0869 -0.3812 0.0069 0.0331 
COMP -0.0650 -2.2350 -0.0704 -2.3960 0.0213 0.7195 0.0314 1.1160 
DISTC -0.0044 -0.0311 -0.0087 -0.0612 0.0849 0.7621 0.0743 0.7030 
NMIN 0.1296 5.9470 0.1292 5.7990 0.0800 4.3790 0.0803 4.6560 
PID -0.0531 -2.6090 -0.0616 -3.0040 -0.0024 -0.1366 0.0104 0.5858 
AVMIN -0.8908 -4.6590 -0.9015 -4.5130 -0.3973 -2.0490 -0.2098 -1.1680 
MAXMIN 2.9039 15.9200 2.9432 15.3500 1.5880 8.7280 1.7668 10.1200 
NV -5.0307 -4.2920 -5.5566 -4.5870 -4.3129 -3.7120 -3.1707 -2.7640 
DD 0.0017 2.8140 0.0018 2.9780 -0.0007 -1.3050 -0.0007 -1.3650 
NSHCD -0.0018 -3.8760 -0.0019 -3.8220 -0.0013 -3.3460 -0.0010 -2.7250 
ED 0.0003 2.2680 0.0003 2.2650 0.0002 2.3760 0.0002 2.1200 
EMP 0.0001 2.0250 0.0002 2.0920 0.0000 -0.1002 0.0000 -0.5374 
PUBT -0.0029 -4.9330 -0.0031 -5.0060 -0.0010 -2.1020 -0.0006 -1.3490 
Model Robustness and Diagnostic Test Results 
 R2 0.9518  0.9533  0.9470  0.9543  
 Adjusted R2 0.9420  0.9438  0.9363  0.9450  
 Normality 
of Residuals 52.2747 (22 df)  60.3923 (22 df)  69.4807 (22 df)  84.5310 (22 df)  
Model 
specification 842.190  869.572  560.890   650.741 
 
The results of the price levels and margins models are very similar, indicating that both are yielding 
roughly the same information about the underlying data.  Examining the variables by family, and taking 
branding first, the most obvious characteristic is the different between BP and Caltex.  BP outlets have a 
significant positive coefficient for nine and ten-day cycles, and a significant, negative coefficient for seven-
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day cycles.  This suggests that, relative to Caltex being a BP reduces the amplitude of a seven day cycle 
and increases the amplitude of a nine and ten-day cycle.  For Caltex, the opposite is true.  By contrast, Shell 
is positive in both models, indicating that it has larger seven-day cycles than Caltex, and larger nine and 
ten-day cycles than BP.  This suggests that, whilst all three brands might randomise between cycles, Caltex 
outlets favour seven day cycles, BP outlets favour nine and ten-day cycles and Shell outlets use both 
roughly equally.  None of the other brands give consistent results of the same clarity.  However, it seems 
that Gull outlets tend to follow the longer cycle with greater prevalence, whilst Wesco outlets tend to 
randomise, like Shell.   
 
Location, service and the presence of a convenience store tell us almost nothing about the likelihood of 
either type of cycle that we do not already know from other characteristics.  The former two are 
unsurprising; location effects may in fact be being picked up by some of the demand-side variables, whilst 
the fact that full or partial service outlets are generally independent or branded independent outlets means 
the relevant type characteristics might be picking up the relevant effects.  The convenience store variables 
are interesting, however.  If convenience stores use fuel as a loss-leader, then one might expect that these 
outlets cycle less, using consistently low prices to attract customers.  However, this is not the case; such 
outlets appear little different in their cycles from their parent brands. 
 
The results for type are somewhat intertwined with those for brand, as the discussion following Figure 
Three suggests.  The clearest results come from the SUP variable which, since Caltex-Woolworths is the 
only supermarket joint venture during the same period, suggests that these outlets favour a longer cycle 
over a shorter cycle as BP does.  This is interesting, given that one part of the joint venture, Caltex, 
predominantly uses seven-day cycles.  The other variable of interest here is branded independents; although 
the coefficient is not statistically significant for seven-day cycles, it is negative for both types of cycle, 
which indicates that branded independents tend not to follow cycles.  This is reinforced by the negative 
AVMIN results, which suggest that those outlets with higher gross margins (usually branded independents 
not benefiting from price supports) have less of a tendency to cycle.  This result is important for 
policymakers, for it suggests that, perhaps, larger cycles are the trade-off the market makes for having 
lower margins, and hence prices, during parts of the cycle. 
 
Main road location does not appear to be important, which is unsurprising, as most of the outlets are on 
main roads.  The results for the number of competitors within a five-kilometre drive and the distance to the 
nearest competitor results are more interesting, because the former has statistically significant results (at 
least for seven-day cycles) but the latter does not.  Given that Perth is not a particularly densely populated 
city, these results should perhaps not be surprising; it does not take long to travel 5km on Perth’s roads.   
 
The fact that the variable for the number of competitors is negative and significant for seven-day cycles but 
not for nine and ten day cycles is, perhaps, indicative of the effects of competition.  More outlets in close 
proximity should be associated with more competition, and it is thus unsurprising that this would reduce the 
amplitude of cycles.  What is surprising is that it reduces the amplitude of the shorter seven-day cycles, but 
does not appear to have the same effect on the longer nine and ten-day cycles.  Perhaps, therefore, an 
increase in competition leads to longer cycles, as the competitive rivals are more wary of raising price to 
signal the end of the cycle.  This casts the ACCC’s (2007) finding that the more recent Perth market 
exhibits longer cycles in a different light, suggesting that it has become more competitive during a time 
when the supermarkets have increased their market share, not less competitive.  To explore this issue more 
fully, one would also need to examine price levels (and extend the analysis to the present day), which is 
beyond the scope of this analysis, but perhaps indicative of useful future work. 
 
The results for the number of minima and the MAXMIN variable are unsurprising; both are positive and 
significant, suggesting, rather obviously, that more minima are associated with more cycles and that those 
with a large difference between their maximum and minimum prices over the few days when a price 
change occurs are more likely to cycle.  The negative coefficient on the number of price increase days is 
perhaps reflective of the fact that many independents brands (like Gull) often increase prices over two days, 
rather than one.  However, the lack of significance makes it difficult to interpret much from these results. 
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Finally, when turning to demand side results, the strongest results come from the number of vehicles.  
Indeed these are the largest coefficients in most of the regressions, meaning perhaps that they are picking 
up additional factors pertaining to the uniqueness of each suburb as a local market.  In contrast to the 
results for the number of competitors, both shorter and longer cycles have smaller amplitudes when there 
are more cars in surrounding households.  However, supporting the findings associated with the numbers of 
competitors, the negative effects on nine and ten-day cycles are smaller. Public transport also has a 
negative coefficient (albeit only for shorter cycles), which perhaps suggest that retail outlets compete 
harder in areas where people are less likely to choose their car for commuting trips.  The amount of public 
housing also has a negative effect, suggesting perhaps that income effects drive greater competition in 
poorer areas, where petrol is likely to take up a larger share of the family budget.  In both cases, however, 
the effects are very small. 
 
The demand-side variables with positive coefficients are those for dwelling density, education and 
employment.  All the effects are very small, and they are only significant for the seven-day models.  It is 
not clear what these variables are indicating.  Perhaps, where customers are more well-informed, retailers 
vary price more often to negate some of the benefits of being better-informed.  Again, however, these 
results are rather small, and it is difficult to conclude much that is conclusive from them. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper set out to establish a greater understanding of the nature and the drivers of cycles in the Perth 
retail petroleum market.  In terms of their nature, it appears that the relevant cycles of importance are not 
just a weekly cycle, but actually a cycle of roughly a week, and another of roughly ten days.  In fact, it 
seems that individual outlets will often randomise between these two cycles in an effort to seek 
comparative advantage over nearby rivals. 
 
In terms of explaining the drivers of cycles, branding is clearly important; Caltex outlets tend to favour 
shorter cycles, whilst BP, Gull and Caltex-Woolworths tend to favour longer ones.  Shell and Wesco apply 
both roughly equally.  Very little else about the stations themselves has additional explanatory power, 
except that branded independents tend to cycle less.  Interestingly, despite their using petrol as a loss-
leader, convenience stores do not cycle in a manner which is demonstrably different from their parent 
company. 
 
Branding is not the only driver of cycles; local market conditions also have an impact.  This is most 
strongly reflected through car ownership, and less so through car use for work.  An increase in both of these 
is associated with longer cycles, perhaps suggesting that as competition increases, cycle length increases, as 
firms are less willing to lead prices up again into the next cycle.  The number of competitors nearby also 
suggests similar effects.  By contrast, where education and employment levels are higher, short cycles have 
greater amplitude, which might indicate outlets changing prices more rapidly to counteract the effects of 
better-informed customers.  However, these effects are very weak. 
 
The results of this study shed some light on why the ACCC (2007) might have found price cycles 
enigmatic.  Whilst demand-side factors appear to have some role, this is largely location specific, and might 
be lost if one were to examine the market as a whole.  Moreover, whilst it is possible to differentiate 
differences in behaviour between brands, there is no logical reason why a given brand might adopt a 
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